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Administrative Law. Kyros v. Rhode Island Dep’t of Health,
253 A.3d 897 (R.I. 2021). The Rhode Island Department of Health
Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline must present findings of
fact to support their decisions when issuing a final sanction. If the
agency fails to do so, the trial justice may set aside the decision as
arbitrary or capricious. Further, a trial justice may refrain from
remanding a case back to an agency when doing so would not be in
the interest of justice and would not provide new information.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In August of 2009, plaintiff, William Kyros (Dr. Kyros), entered
into an Agreement to Cease Practice (Agreement) with the Rhode
Island Department of Health Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline (Board) because the Board had received notice that Dr. Kyros “‘engaged in unprofessional conduct by engaging in serious professional boundary violations with patients.’”1 The Agreement
required Dr. Kyros to:
[C]ease practicing any branch of medicine[,] . . . go for an
evaluation at the Sante Center for healing, . . . [t]he evaluation report must be sent directly to the Board [, and that
t]he board will make a determination on final sanctions after it reviews and considers the evaluation report from the
Sante Center for healing.2
Dr. Kyros acted in accordance with the Agreement and attended the
Sante Center (Center) from August 17 – 20, 2009.3 The Center produced a fifty-four-page report that recommended “Dr. Kyros should
not return to the unrestricted practice of medicine through direct
psychiatric care”, at the appropriate time he should return to supervised practice, and that Dr. Kyros should successfully complete
1. Kyros v. Rhode Island Dep’t of Health, 253 A.3d 897, 881 (R.I. 2021).
2. Id. By signing the agreement Dr. Kyros waved his right to a hearing
and possible disciplinary action if the agreement is violated. Id.
3. Id.
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an education course on maintaining proper boundaries.4 The report
was received by the Board on September 25, 2009.5
Subsequently, Dr. Kyros contacted the board seeking guidance
on what he needed to do next, but he received no response.6 As a
result, on his own accord, Dr. Kyros “began treating with Edward
Brown, M.D., and Gene Jacobs, O.D.”7 Additionally, in September
2010 Dr. Kyros completed the recommended course in Medical Ethics, Boundaries & Professionalism.8
On June 10, 2013, Dr. Kyros reached out to the Board again to
discuss his next steps and included a report from Dr. Jacobs’ detailed treatment and diagnosis, which concluded that Dr. Kyros no
longer needed psychiatric follow up care and Dr. Jacobs believed
there was “no reason why Dr. Kyros cannot restart clinical practice.”9
After submitting the report, Dr. Kyros met with James McDonald M.D., the chief administrative officer of the Board.10 At which
point, Dr. Kyros was told by Dr. McDonald to, “engage with the
chairperson of the Physicians Health Committee of the Rhode Island Medical Society.”11 Dr. Kyros complied, and in August 2013,
Dr. Kyros met with Chairperson Herbert Rakatansky, M.D..12
Chairperson Rakatansky instructed Dr. Kyros to “undergo a forensic psychiatric evaluation.”13 Dr. Kyros again complied and underwent the evaluation by Daniel Harrop, M.D., who then submitted
the final report from the evaluation to chairperson Rakatansky.14
The report concluded that Dr. Kyros was fit to have his license returned for unrestricted practice.15
On September 9, 2013
4. Id. The report outlined the plaintiff’s personal history, evaluations by
several heath care professionals, the results of two polygraph examinations,
and a preliminary recommendation. The report did not address Dr. Kyros’ skill
and competence because that was beyond the scope of the assessment. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 882.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Chairperson Rakatansky contacted Dr. McDonald and notified him
of the results.16
On December 4, 2013, Dr. Kyros was officially issued a preliminary finding of “unprofessional conduct” by the Board.17 Dr. Kyros
met with Dr. McDonald in January of 2014 to discuss “a potential
resolution to the charge of unprofessional conduct” but they failed
to reach an agreement because Dr. Kyros opposed supervision and
probation.18 Dr. Kyros failed to attend the formal hearing due to
“financial circumstances.”19
For the next two years, with the aid of new counsel, Dr. Kyros
engaged in discovery to prepare for an eventual hearing before the
Board.20 The parties met during that time on several occasions to
discuss a settlement, but failed to reach an agreement.21 As a result, in March 2017, Dr. Kyros requested a formal hearing before
the Board “regarding his fitness to return to the practice of medicine as contemplated in the” Agreement.22 Additionally, Dr Kyros
submitted a “reinstatement application” to the Board.23 However,
after delays due to the complexity of the application, the licensing
committee voted to “require Dr. Kyros to ‘attend the Sant[e] Center
for a re-evaluation’ … [and]… ‘to attend the Center for Personalized
Education for Physicians (CPEP) to assess his clinical competency
to practice.’”24
On September 18, 2017, Dr. Kyros made another request for a
formal hearing.25 Dr. McDonald invited Dr. Kyros to appear before
the licensing committee again, but Dr. Kyros declined to re-appear
and voiced his objections to the prior requirements from the committee because he felt “it was unnecessary given the extensive

16. Id. Chairperson Rakatansky noted there was no reason to doubt the
conclusions reached by Dr. Jacobs and Dr. Harrop. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 882–83.
25. Id. at 883.
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treatment he had undergone.”26 The Committee denied Dr. Kyros’
licensure application on October 10, 2017.27
In November of 2017, “[a] one-count specification of charges
was issued against Dr. Kyros” alleging he engaged in unprofessional conduct in violation of G.L. §5-37-5.1.28 An evidentiary hearing was conducted, and the Board issued a ten page decision dated
November 14, 2018 that outlined four findings of fact.29 First, there
was no finding that Dr. Kyros engaged in unprofessional conduct
and second, Dr. Kyros was ordered to attend the CPEP and complete a competency assessment program prior to re-entering practice.30
Dr. Kyros filed a timely notice of appeal to the Superior Court
alleging the usual grounds for administrative appeal, which include:
[T]he decision was (1) in violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions; (2) in excess of the Board’s
and DOH’s Authority; (3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law; (5) Clearly erroneous; and
(6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion.31
The trial justice, on December 13, 2019, reversed the Boards
decision.32 The Superior Court held that the Board arbitrarily
found Dr. Kyros clinically incompetent solely on the grounds that
he had not clinically practiced in nine-years.33 Additionally, the
Superior Court stated “[a]lthough the court would typically be
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. This section outlines thirty-one items that may constitute unprofessional misconduct. Dr. Kyros is charged with violating number 24, which
states conduct qualifies as unprofessional conduct as “[v]iolating any provision
. . . of this chapter or the rules and regulations of the board or any rules or
regulations promulgated by the director or of an action, stipulation, or agreement of the board[.]” 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37-5.1 (24) (West).
29. The hearing included presentation of documentary and testimonial evidence. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Court is allowed to reverse or modify the agencies decision if
any one of these six objections are satisfied. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-3515(g) (West).
32. Kyros, 253 A.3d at 884.
33. Id.
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inclined to remand this case to RIDOH for further proceedings—
with respect to inadequate findings of fact—here, the [c]ourt finds
that doing so would only cause more harm and opportunity for delay
after a nearly decade-long saga.”34 The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island granted the defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari on the
arguments, that the Boards decision was not arbitrary or capricious
and the trial court erred in not remanding the case to the Board for
further proceedings.35
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The defendants asserted two claims of error by the Superior
Court.36 First, they argued the trial justice erred in finding that
the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported
by evidence of competence.37 Second, the defendants argued that
the trial justice erred in declining to remand the case to the Board
for further proceedings.38
A. Arbitrary and Capricious
The Board is required to “prepare written findings of fact and
law” to support their decisions, and if they fail to do so, the Court
may, “pursuant to §43-35-15(g), find the decision erroneous and unsupported by evidence, or arbitrary or capricious.”39 One of the disputes in this case was which document was controlling.40 The DOH
argued that the controlling document to support the sanctioned
“CPEP requirement was made pursuant to the Agreement [to Cease
Practice],” and not the charge.41 However, the Court ruled that the
controlling document in this case was the specification of charges
issued, and because the charge was not sustained no disciplinary
action was imposed.42

34. Id.
35. Id. at 885, 887.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 885.
38. Id. at 887.
39. Id. at 887 (citing Sakonnet Rogers, Inc. v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 536 A.2d 893, 896 (R.I. 1988)).
40. Id. at 885.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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The Court highlighted three problems with the DOH’s argument.43 First, the Board made no findings that Dr. Kyros violated
the terms of the Agreement.44 To the contrary, the Court concluded
that Dr. Kyros attempted to fulfill all his obligations under the
Agreement.45 Moreover, the Court stated that the Board neglected
its obligation for nine years to impose final sanctions under the
Agreement and concluded that the Board “ultimately imposed
none.”46
Second, the Court stated, “the record was devoid of any evidence that Dr. Kyros was not clinically competent to practice medicine.”47 The defendants argued the nine year lapse “speaks for itself relative to the question of clinical competence.”48 The Court
reasoned that the defendant’s assumption “ignores the reliable and
probative evidence in the record,”49 and thus concluded the DOH
“failed to present any evidence and made no findings” of fact to support the CPEP requirement.50
Third, the Court stated the requirement was outside the scope
of the Agreement because the Agreement was silent on the question
of clinical competency.51 Part of the Agreement was that the Board
would “take into consideration the Sante Center’s report when determining any licensing and discipline issues.”52 However, skill
and competence was beyond the scope of the assessment and the
Court concluded that reliance on the report would be misplaced if
used to impose the CPEP requirement.53 Therefore, the Court affirmed the Superior Courts ruling, which reversed the board’s decision as arbitrary and capricious.54

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 885–86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id. at 887.
Id.
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 887.
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B. Declining to Remand
“Parties who are subject to administrative proceedings have
the right to an expeditious agency decision and judicial decision.”55
The defendants argued the trial justice erred in failing to remand
the case to the Board because “the protection of the health and
safety of the public ‘outweigh[s] the concern for prejudice of [Dr.
Kyros’s] right to a final adjudication within a reasonable period.’”56
However, the Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that a remand
to an administrative agency may not be appropriate where it would
not further the interest of justice or provide new information.57
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s decision in declining to remand for three reasons.58 First, the Court highlighted
that Dr. Kyros voluntarily ceased practicing medicine for more than
nine years.59 Second, the Court found that continuing the delay
would not further the interest of justice.60 Lastly, the Court believed that remanding the matter back to the Board would not produce new information because “there is no evidentiary support in
the record that Dr. Kyros is not clinically competent.”61
C. Dissent
Justice Robinson dissented from the majority’s opinion on two
grounds.62 First, Justice Robinson believed the Agreement was the
controlling document in this case.63 Justice Robinson noted that
the Agreement was signed by both parties, the Agreement did not
contain any time provision, and because the Agreement allows the
Board to determine final sanctions, it was within their power to require a CEPD competency assessment.64 Thus, he concluded it was

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Champlin’s Realty Associates v. Tikoian, 989 A.2d 427, 449
(R.I. 2010)).
58. Id. at 888.
59. Id. at 887.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 888.
62. Id. (Robinson, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 889.
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an error for the trial justice to reverse the Boards decision to issue
a final sanction.65
Second, Justice Robinson believed it was the responsibility of
the board, “to see to it that the public is properly protected when
the Board is dealing with a doctor who … had not practiced medicine in approximately nine years.”66 Justice Robinson noted that
Dr. Kyros has not practiced medicine for twelve years now and
“twelve years away from any profession would likely affect one’s
competency and skill.”67 Therefore, Justice Robinson concluded,
“that fact alone serves to show that the Boards decision was not
arbitrary and capricious.”68
COMMENTARY

In the case at hand, the Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged the necessity for agencies to establish all necessary findings
of fact before issuing a final decision.69 As such, the Court spent
ample time in discussing all the areas in which the Board failed to
meet the required burden of making some findings of fact to support
their decision.70 First, the Court stated that “the Boards decision
overlooked, and indeed ignored, the specification of charges . . . [and
that] the Board never made a finding that Dr. Kyros was guilty of
unprofessional conduct.”71 Second, the Court stated that “[t]he
Board made no finding that Dr. Kyros violated the terms of the
Agreement.”72 Third, the “Board made no findings about Dr. Kyros’
clinical competency.”73 This case follows the long-standing rule
that an agency must prepare some written findings of fact and law
to support their conclusions and decisions, and if they fail to do so,
the decision may be found arbitrary or capricious.74
Additionally, The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged
that it is within the trial courts power to make a final ruling on an
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 889–90.
Id. at 888–89.
Id. at 890.
Id.
Id. at 885–887 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 887; 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-35-159(g) (West).
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agencies decision and choose to not remand the case back to the
agency.75 The trial court may choose to do so when remanding
would not further the interest of justice or fail to provide new information.76 The Court did not address whether both items must be
met as a factor test or whether the interests are balanced because
in this case the Court believed both were met.
Justice Robinson, dissenting, made two convincing arguments.
Justice Robinson argued that the controlling document in the case
should be the Agreement to Cease Practice.77 He believed the
agreement should be the controlling document because both parties
signed the contract, the contract did not have a time provision, and
a provision of the contract allowed the Board to issue a final sanction.78 Based on general contract principles, this seems to be a
sound argument.
Second, Justice Robinson pointed to language from the Rhode
Island Code of Regulations pertaining to the DOH, which states, “If
a physician has not engaged in the active practice of medicine for
two (2) years or more . . . [t]he Board may establish clinical competency [through] [a]n evaluation of clinical competency by a Board
approved organization, such as the Center for Personalized Education for Physicians.”79 As Justice Robinson points out, because of
the date of enactment the regulation does not apply to this case.80
However, the language should be noted because the Board can now
require, under statute, a physician to establish clinical competency
through the CPEP after being removed from practice for just two
years.81
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to reverse the Rhode Island Department of Health Board of
Medical Licensure and Discipline committees order requiring Dr.
Kyros to attend the Center for Personalized Education for Physicians and complete a competence assessment program prior to re75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Kyros, 253 A.3d at 887–88.
Id. at 887.
Id. at 888 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 889–90.
Id. at 890–91; 216 R.I. CODE R. 40-05-1.5.1(E).
Kyros, 253 A.3d at 891.
Id.
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entering practice because the order was arbitrary and capricious.82
Additionally, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision in declining to remand the case back to the Board for further proceedings
because remanding the case back to the Board would not further
the interest of justice,83 and remanding the matter back to the
Board would not produce new information.84
Andrew Spaulding

82. Id. at 887 (majority opinion).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 888.

